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Increasing exclusion and inequality in Honduras have posed escalating security risks for women in 
their homes and on the streets. In this article, we examine gender-based violence against women, 
including gender-motivated murders (feminicides), the everyday acts that can result in their 
deaths, and impunity for these crimes. Rather than analyzing these murders as interpersonal 
acts or linking them to economic deprivation, we examine the actions and inactions of the 
state that have amplified violence in the lives of Honduran women. We distinguish between the 
state’s acts of omission and acts of commission in order to identify the political responsibility 
and failures that create a fertile ground for these killings. A context of multisided violence that 
facilitates extreme violence in the lives of women is present in Honduras, especially considering 
the diminishing power of civil society groups and increased political repression after the 2009 
coup. We identify root causes of the wide (and widening) gap between laws on the books—which 
have been passed mostly to satisfy international and domestic organizations pushing for 
change—and laws in action, that is, implementation on the ground. Although we focus on 
Honduras, we note similar experiences of extreme violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and in 
other countries in the Latin American region.
Introduction
We cannot go back to Honduras. . . . They will kill us. With gangs it is very difficult. . . . The gang 
members wear the same vests and use the same guns that the police do. How do they get hold of 
these guns and vests? From the police.
—A woman who has fled Honduras (UNHCR 2015, 24)
For years, Honduras stayed under the radar of international attention, particularly of the US public. This 
is despite the fact that Honduras has served US interests in Central America in various forms and degrees, 
playing a key role during the 1980s when it was the staging ground for military operations and training that 
sustained the wars in that region. However, in recent years, a series of events have thrust Honduras into the 
limelight, starting with the 2009 coup that ousted the democratically elected president Manuel Zelaya. This 
event accelerated and exacerbated a security crisis in Honduras and the northern countries of Central America 
that has resulted in the destabilization of families, worsening of the economy, and increasing violence.1 The 
woman quoted above is one among thousands of women fleeing such conditions and seeking refuge in the 
United States. Thus, while the Latin American region as a whole seems to have entered a new era of openness, 
 1 The Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) has observed that in post-coup Honduras grave violations of human 
rights take place, such as killings, arbitrary calls for state of exception, repression of protest through excessive use of force, 
criminalization of social protest, increased arbitrary detentions, degrading and inhumane treatment of detainees, militarization of 
the national territory, increase in racial discrimination, violations of women’s rights, serious restrictions on free speech, and grave 
infringement of political rights. The CIDH also noted the inefficacy of the judicial system in protecting human rights (CIDH 2009, 
paragraph 551).
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and many countries have agendas to address inequalities and effect fundamental change, not all countries are 
aligning with this trend. Some, like Honduras, seem to have stepped back into the 1980s with coups, repression, 
and political violence that now is almost indistinguishable from “common” crime. Honduras recently had the 
highest homicide rate in the world. Today that distinction belongs to El Salvador, but these two countries have 
alternated between the first and second places in the past several years. In Honduras, this rate has steadily 
gone up with the increased militarization of the state since the 2009 coup d’état.2 Importantly, in spite of 
intraregional differences in democratic processes, Latin America as a whole has seen a marked increase in 
levels of interpersonal violence (PNUD 2013). High levels of violence once again are threatening democracy in 
the region (Arias and Goldstein 2010).
Increasing exclusion and inequality in Honduras have posed escalating security risks for women in the 
home and on the streets. Although poverty and marginality affect everyone in the country, these conditions 
impact women and men differently. Both women and men are robbed, extorted, and killed. However, women 
suffer qualitatively different and more extreme forms of brutality in the form of feminicide and various other 
forms of gender violence. In this article, we examine gender-based violence against women, the everyday 
acts that can result in their deaths, but not as solely interpersonal acts or by linking them primarily to 
economic deprivation. Rather, we examine the actions and inactions of the state that have served to amplify 
violence in the lives of Honduran women. While we expose women’s poverty-related vulnerabilities, our 
approach moves beyond income disparities to highlight inequalities in citizenship rights where the state is a 
key player in perpetuating and reinforcing unequal access to justice and rights. We point to the confluence 
of factors that facilitate violent conditions for women that can ultimately culminate in their killings, and 
in doing so we reveal processes by which structural inequality translates into unequal access to safety and 
justice for Honduran women.3
Before we embark on our discussion, a note about terminology is necessary. Killings of women are 
often referred to as “femicide,” that is, the killings of women because they are women (Radford and 
Russell 1992). We prefer the term “feminicide” because embedded in this term is the role the state 
plays in these killings. In contexts of impunity such as Honduras, the brutal killings of women denote 
the complicity of the state through its unwillingness or inability to provide prevention and response 
mechanisms (see Lagarde 2010). The state also plays a more direct role in violence used to silence 
women in the political arena. State agents have committed sexualized violence and participated directly 
in injuring or killing women. This situation compounds inequality, as women become more afraid 
to engage in public life, which deeply curtails their citizenship rights. Honduras is characterized by 
Guillermo O’Donnell’s conceptualization of “brown areas,” that is, areas where the legal state is absent, 
resulting in a compromised rule of law. In these areas, “whatever formally sanctioned law exists is 
applied intermittently, if at all” by subnational systems of power (e.g., patrimonial or even gangster-like), 
with informal legal systems that coexist with national regimes that have formal legal systems and are 
nominally democratic (O’Donnell 2004, 38–39).
We distinguish between the state’s acts of omission and acts of commission in order to identify the 
political responsibility and failures of the state that create a fertile ground for these killings (see also Sanford, 
Stefanos, and Salvi 2016). Omission (or inaction) includes indirect mechanisms such as failure to provide 
prevention, protection, and prosecution. It can also include failure to implement laws to protect women, as 
when a negligent state “averts its gaze” (Scheper-Hughes 1992) and simply looks the other way. Commission 
(or action) includes direct actions, such as sexual violence, threats, and the targeting of women leaders for 
persecution and police harassment.4 Both types of acts have roots in the same social context that normalizes 
and sustains violence as well as in profound gender inequalities. This context also shapes the lens through 
which state actors assess information, justify acts, and implement laws. Decoupling the role of the state into 
commission and omission allows us to analyze the responsibility of the government in the surge of killings 
before and after the coup.
 2 The 2012 homicide rate for Honduras was 90.4 homicides per 100,000 in the population. The most recent comparable rates 
available for North and Central America are from 2012, in descending order: El Salvador (41.2), Guatemala (39.9), Mexico (21.5), 
Panama (17.2), Nicaragua (11.3), Costa Rica (8.5), the United States (4.7) and Canada (1.6) (UNODC 2012). See Figure 2. For the 
northernmost countries of Central America, the most recent comparable rates are from 2014, as follows: Honduras: 75; El Salvador: 
64; Guatemala: 31 (World Bank 2014).
 3 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to our attention.
 4 State actors also engage in crimes by directly collaborating with criminal groups, taking bribes, etc. Here, however, we focus only 
on the formal, licit actions and inactions of the state in relation to violence. 
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To be sure, the Honduran government before the coup engaged in actions that disregarded gender-based 
violence against women and did not take effective steps in addressing it, thus committing acts of omission. 
These failures have worsened with the post-coup government, which has taken more direct measures 
that have escalated acts of omission as well as commission in systematically persecuting women leaders 
and physically and sexually assaulting women. This is perhaps best exemplified by the assassination of 
environmental activists, such as the killing of indigenous leader Berta Cáceres, who was murdered in March 
2016 after receiving multiple threats following her opposition to the construction of a hydroelectric dam. 
Yet the police alleged her murder had taken place in connection with a robbery. Even if the government 
is not killing women directly, acts of commission and omission create conditions that promote impunity 
and increase risks of victimization by normalizing the targeting of women for violence, at home and in the 
streets. Though acts of omission may not directly involve the state in the killings, inaction can also lead to 
such killings. Thus, through direct and indirect mechanisms, the post-coup government has exacerbated the 
context within which women are killed, and impunity is widespread.
Honduras has ratified regional and international conventions and has laws on the books criminalizing 
intrafamilial violence, rape, and killings of women. However, the police and courts have undermined the 
aims of these laws by failing to implement them effectively or even by directly assaulting women. We argue 
that these government actions and inactions are linked to intersections among political, social, and economic 
exclusion that are a consequence and a cause of gendered inequality, creating a particularly violent context 
for women. In our conceptualization, the same context that creates conditions for extreme forms of violence 
also impedes justice as it perpetuates unequal access to the justice system on the basis of gender and, in this 
way, subverts women’s citizenship rights.
The recent spiral of violence in the lives of women and lack of protection can best be understood by 
examining the political responsibility of the state within a context of multisided violence. This context 
includes structural, political, symbolic, and everyday violence that reinforces and undergirds the 
normalization of persistent impunity and violence in the lives of women. This sociopolitical architecture 
sustains and perpetuates gendered violence and impunity. We argue that the more extreme the context 
of multisided violence, the higher the probability that states will fail in their responses to violence against 
women through normalizing and institutionalizing profound gender inequalities and undermining 
citizenship rights for women. This context is particularly present in Honduras, especially considering the 
diminishing power of civil society groups and increased political repression after the coup. Past research 
has linked levels of feminicide to discrimination, poverty, and negative attitudes toward women (Prieto-
Carrón, Thomson, and MacDonald 2007). We move past these associations to reveal more systematically 
how structural and institutional violence creates a context of violence that cannot be reduced to violent 
individuals; it is embedded in the broader social order, gender inequality, the perpetuation of violence, 
impunity, and women’s diminished rights.
We focus on how broader structures of inequality conjoin with political forces to maintain these structures 
and intensify their impact. This approach allows us to identify root causes of the wide (and widening) 
gap between laws on the books—which have been passed mostly to satisfy international and domestic 
organizations pushing for change—and laws in action, that is, implementation on the ground. This gap 
diminishes women’s citizenship rights and enables the rise of feminicides. A law on the books may not be 
enough to address an issue if contextual factors do not align with the aims of the law (Eisenberg 2011). And 
although we focus on Honduras, we note similar experiences of extreme violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and other countries in the Latin American region (Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres 2012; Hume 2009; 
Menjívar 2011; UN 2011; Walsh 2008).
Theoretical Framework
To understand how the state responds (or fails to respond) to violence against women in Honduras, we use 
an analytic perspective that permits us to factor in the social and structural conditions that shape gender 
violence and within which laws are written and interpreted. A lens of multisided violence includes aspects 
of structural, symbolic, and political violence that intersect with gender violence (Walsh and Menjívar 2016; 
Menjívar 2011; Menjívar and Walsh 2016). The layered and interconnected nature of these forms of violence 
contributes to their normalization and the internalization of frames through which individuals understand 
and make sense of the social world (Menjívar 2011). A multilayered, normalized context of violence shapes 
the views, frameworks, and cognitive frames through which individuals (including justice system personnel) 
view violence, and in this way forms a sociopolitical architecture that orders life and shapes frames of 
reference. Thus, those who perpetrate violent acts and those in charge of implementing the law to address 
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such acts draw their frameworks, viewpoints, and attitudes about gender roles, women, and violence from 
the same social “order of things” (see Kleinman 2000). The intersection of various forms of violence results 
in the kind of increased gender violence and impunity that has become a crisis in Honduras.
Structural Violence
Structural violence is exerted both systematically and indirectly, often exposing itself in social structures as 
inequality. It results in oppressive conditions of poverty and lack of opportunity for marginalized sectors 
of society such as poor women (Menjívar 2011). The state plays a fundamental direct and indirect role in 
creating structurally violent conditions for large segments of the population. Who ends up poor is not an 
accident; it is the outcome of deliberate policy decisions that cause and perpetuate social and economic 
exclusion. Neoliberal reforms that lead to the displacement of workers, increases in unemployment, 
underemployment, and insecurity lie at the root of expanded forms of structural violence in the lives of the 
poor today.
Significantly, structural violence is gendered. Women are disproportionately impoverished on a global 
scale, and Honduras is no exception. While poverty may not impact initial risks of exposure to physical 
violence, it puts poor women at extreme risk for repeated victimization and at a disadvantage in exercising 
their citizenship rights. Structural violence is also built into the structure of the state through policy 
decisions that have shrunk social spending budgets. Some of the effects on women are manifested in social 
expectations for women to attend to the needs of their families, secure food for their children, and protect 
them in the face of danger (Menjívar 2011). The lack of specialized services for women in the police and 
courts, despite pressure by women’s organizations to provide them, exemplifies the structural violence of 
the state’s actions, which maintain women’s marginalization and perpetuate it through systemic failures 
to provide them with prevention, protection, or prosecution of violence. As Ronderos (2011, 2) notes, “In a 
context of unequal distribution of wealth, scarce resources and weak institutions, impunity prevails within 
the justice system.” Thus, women are kept disproportionately poor through policy design and become even 
more vulnerable to violence as policies contribute to maintaining impunity.
Political Violence and State Terror
Although Honduras did not experience an internal armed conflict as did neighboring Central American 
countries, political violence and state terror prevailed, with gendered expressions. Political violence of the 
past has been characterized as targeting opposition groups. In contrast, today’s state violence concentrates 
on “common” criminals, often gangs. The violence used in both cases is remarkably similar; repressive tactics 
used against the opposition in the past are now used to combat gangs and criminal groups. These tactics 
contribute to the militarization of society, as in the past, when society became accustomed to seeing violent 
government actions as ordinary and military power structures as natural and accepted. Thus, Enloe (2000) 
observes, lives become militarized not only through direct means and exposure but also when militarized 
views and attitudes are taken as natural and unproblematic, with a reciprocal relationship between violence 
from the state and violence in private spheres (Hay 1992). Structural and political violence interact: the 
structural violence of neoliberal reforms implemented in deeply unequal societies increases poverty and 
constrains choices for poor Hondurans, who turn to gang membership in order to survive (Wolseth 2011). In 
turn, the government responds with aggressive policies to combat gang violence, creating new territories of 
violence (Gutiérrez Rivera 2013). In a continuum of state violence, there are haunting similarities between 
signs of gendered violence and sexualized torture found on victims of feminicide today and methods of 
torture used against women during the civil war years in the region (Sanford 2008). Political violence is 
maintained and exacerbated through state actions of omission as well as commission—through failing to 
address issues of impunity for political violence and through committing it directly.
Symbolic Violence
According to Bourdieu (2004), symbolic violence refers to the internalized humiliations and legitimations 
of inequality and hierarchy that range from sexism and racism to intimate expressions of class power. A key 
point in Bourdieu’s conceptualization is that the everyday, normalized familiarity with violence renders it 
unexceptional; power structures are normalized and accepted—always there—and the mechanisms through 
which violence is exerted recede from conscious knowing.
Perhaps the most powerful form of symbolic violence, in Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (2004, 272) 
conceptualization, comes from “the social order of things.” It normalizes mistreatment against vulnerable 
members of society, and this normalization becomes part of the cognitive frames through which individuals 
make sense of the world. This social order reinforces and normalizes expectations of gendered behavior, 
Menjívar and Walsh 225 
and thus perpetrators come to expect not to be held accountable for their acts. Impunity then becomes 
embedded in relations with authorities and the judicial system. The imprint of symbolic violence can be 
seen in the routinized daily acts of control, humiliations, and stigmatization of women and their bodies, 
and the naturalized acceptance of women’s manifold forms of social exclusion in education, health, and 
employment. It is also expressed in a general devaluation of poor women’s lives, as well as in women’s 
self-recrimination for their own victimization when they fail to meet the norms imposed on them. These 
expressions do not cause Honduran women’s murders but cumulatively set the conditions for them, as 
symbolic violence legitimizes the devaluation of women’s lives. Because symbolic violence is constitutive of 
the social order, it seeps through to permeate state institutions, where it is expressed in the state’s acts of 
omission and commission. For example, the state may fail to promote policies and campaigns that would 
value the lives of marginalized citizens in general. Further, they may perpetuate this devaluation when 
judges and police blame victims for the abuses against them by accusing them of failing to “behave well.” 
When women encounter these justifications and dismissals of violence against them, the justice system 
reinforces abuse as a mechanism of subordination.
Gender Violence and Gendered Violence
Gender and gendered violence is a transversal aspect of structural, political, and symbolic violence; all of 
these types of violence have gendered expressions. Hammar (1999) observes that differences in a gender-
imbalanced political economy that disadvantage women represent gender violence, whereas acts of violence, 
including physical, psychological and linguistic, constitute gendered violence (1999, 91). And it is precisely 
the expression of gender violence and gendered violence in everyday life (in the home and the streets) that 
contributes to their normalization—they are always there, part of the way things are. Everyday practices 
sustain the normalization of gender violence but also justify punishments for deviations from normative 
gender role expectations. Gendered and gender violence interact with structural, political, and symbolic 
violence to produce a multilayered system that increasingly hurts women and affects poor and vulnerable 
women in particular (Menjívar 2011). And gendered and gender violence are maintained and exacerbated 
through the symbolic violence of state actions of omission and commission. This confluence also sets 
the conditions for feminicide to occur. In our conceptualization, political exclusion, entrenched gender 
ideologies, and persistent inequality contribute to escalating security risks for women in Honduras and in 
other countries that share a similar confluence of factors.
Data and Methods
In a previous study, we inductively identified mechanisms that create conditions for extreme violence in 
the lives of women in Guatemala and El Salvador (Menjívar 2011; Walsh and Menjívar 2016) and we adapt 
this lens to examine the Honduran case. We use the “extreme-case” method, which focuses on case studies 
with extreme outcomes, like notable successes or failures (Gerring 2007, 101). This method helps to reveal 
how normalization operates as a causal mechanism in the relationship between the context of multisided 
violence (the cause) and extreme violence against women and impunity (the outcome).
There are various approaches to data collection that could be used to examine the questions we address, 
but we opted for assembling different sources of unobtrusive data to address this sensitive topic. One 
egregious act of omission on the part of the Honduran state post-coup is that it has increasingly failed to 
maintain databases on crimes against women and, consequently, there has been a dearth of data on violence 
against women in the post-coup years. Thus, we have resorted to piecing together the data we could find. 
Rather than using more direct and extensive interviews and surveys, we use other forms of primary and 
secondary data.
Our primary data are the laws on the books in Honduras that address violence against women, including 
intrafamilial violence and feminicide, as the state manifests itself in people’s lives through law. We also 
reference a recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees report (UNHCR 2015) based on interviews 
with 160 Central American and Mexican women fleeing the violence; Menjívar assisted in the design of 
the data collection instrument and in writing the report. Further, we rely on two country expert affidavits 
presented in court proceedings of Honduran women seeking asylum in the United States, which cover the 
implementation of laws on violence against women in Honduras.5 We also use an interview with a Honduran 
human rights lawyer who is an expert on gender-based violence in her country. Secondary data come from 
 5 One of these affidavits was shared with permission to cite it by the University of California Hastings College of Law Center on 
Gender and Refugee Studies. The other was shared with permission by the author. The affidavits are sworn statements by experts 
on Honduras providing testimony to country conditions with reference to state responsiveness or lack of response to violence 
against women.
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reports by civil society organizations, the Honduran government, the press, and international organizations 
reporting on the levels and types of violence that women sustain and the advances and limitations of the 
laws. To complement these sources we make use of country-level statistical data. Culling information from 
these various sources allows us to triangulate our data and focus on areas of overlapping evidence regarding 
how women are treated or mistreated in the justice system rather than randomly selecting cases or focusing 
on outliers.
We examine the laws on the books to identify advances addressing violence against women. We also 
highlight the laws’ limitations given the context in which they are interpreted and implemented. Drawing 
from testimonies and reports, we analyze how laws operate on the ground where there are multiple obstacles 
to implementation in the police and courts. This lens allows us to reveal how the structure and application 
of laws normalizes and reinstantiates violence against women, rather than combating or eradicating it.
Background and Country Conditions: Foundations for Feminicide
According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Honduras has one of the highest feminicide rates in the 
world (see Figure 1 for the trend in 2002–2013). The number of women murdered in Honduras has been 
rising steadily but spiked after 2010. Within Latin America, Honduras recently ranked third in feminicide 
rates behind El Salvador (the highest in the world today) and Guatemala (the second highest in Latin 
America), and had higher rates than Colombia and Bolivia (Alvazzi del Frate 2011).6 (See Figure 2 for a 
comparison of homicide rates in Central and North America, showing a rising rate in Honduras from 2006, 
which began to exceed murder rates in all other neighboring countries in 2009.)
While the murder rate for women is lower than that for men, the rate for women has been consistently 
increasing since 2005, when there have been some periods of decline in the murders of men (Memoria 
Foro Femicidios 2014, 8). As Incháustegui Romero et al. (2012) observed for feminicide cases in Mexico, the 
murders of men show more elasticity than those of women, as the murders of men tend to respond to events 
or conditions with which they are associated, such as increases or decreases in organized crime, while the 
murders of women occur independently of specific contextual events. And whereas the killings of Honduran 
women before the coup showed an upward trend, the trend accelerated following the coup, demonstrating 
 6 Half of the countries in the world with very high feminicide rates are located in Latin America and the Caribbean region (Hastings 
2014, 1).
Figure 1: Number of feminicides in Honduras, 2002–2013. Adapted from Memoria Foro Femicidios 2014, 8.
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that propitious structural conditions for women’s killings already existed pre-coup but were exacerbated 
post-coup. We argue that the state’s actions played a key role.
Under pressure from domestic groups and international organizations, pre-coup Honduran governments 
passed a series of laws that offered measures protecting women from violence and discrimination, including 
a law against domestic violence (1997) and a law of equal opportunities for women (2000). The post-coup 
de facto government also passed a femicide law with stronger penalties for the killings of women (2013) (see 
Table 1). Thus, even though Honduras had laws to address violence against women before the coup, they 
Table 1: Honduran laws addressing forms of violence against women.
Year Law
1982 National Constitution. Establishes equal rights between men and women and prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sex.** 
1997 Law against Domestic Violence (U.S. Department of State 2015).** 
2000 Law of Equal Opportunities for Women (Ávila 2014, 2).**
2004 CEDAW: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ratified in 
October (U.S. Department of State 2015).*
2005 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women 
“Convention of Belém do Pará,” ratified in March (U.S. Department of State 2015).*
2013 Femicide Law. Legislative Decree 23, 2013. Established femicide (killings of women) as a crime punishable 
with 30–40 years imprisonment.**
*International or regional convention.
**Domestic legislation.
Figure 2: Overall homicide rates in Central and North America. Adapted from Memoria Foro Femicidios 
2014, 8.
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were not effectively implemented. However, implementation has declined further in the post-coup era, even 
as rates of violence against women have continued to rise. Normalized views and structures that devalue 
women’s lives and sustain violence against them existed before the coup, but state actions after the coup 
have amplified these conditions and deepened inequalities.
Thus, despite international recognition of the growing incidence of violence against women in Honduras, 
over 96 percent of feminicides go unpunished (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2011). This 
impunity, an expression of symbolic and gender violence, sends a powerful message that women’s lives are 
expendable and unimportant, as unresponsive justice system institutions fall short in implementing the law 
on the books. Forty percent of the women interviewed for the UNHCR study (2015) who fled the country due 
to violence did not report abuses to the police because they thought it would be useless.
In the 1980s, the United States used Honduras as a staging ground for the Contra War in Nicaragua 
and a base for US training of Salvadoran troops to fight against the Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. During this time, US funding for the Honduran military increased dramatically. 
While domestic political tensions rose, disappearances and murders became commonplace (Booth, Wade, 
and Walker 2010). Honduras became what scholars call a democradura: “a nominally democratic government 
that is really under military rule” (Mateo 2011, 90). The country started experiencing a crime wave in the 
1990s, after the imposition of neoliberal structural adjustment programs increased inequality and repression 
(Booth, Wade, and Walker 2010). Wages stagnated through the 1980s and 1990s, and the destruction in 1998 
by Hurricane Mitch amplified existing poverty and unemployment trends (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2010). 
Neoliberal economic reforms exacerbated environmental degradation and prompted migration to urban 
areas, attracted by the increasing presence of maquila industry employment (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2010; 
Boyer and Pell 1999), as well as migration to the United States. Today, more than half of Hondurans live 
below the poverty line (Mateo 2011).
The crime wave that began in the 1990s became a major theme of the 2001 elections (Booth, Wade, and 
Walker 2010), as the rhetoric of being tough on crime has been used for political gain in Honduras (as well as 
in other countries in the region) (Holland 2013; Krause 2014). While the Honduran government has blamed 
gangs for high murder rates, it is difficult to disaggregate gang activity from other sources of crime, as 
both are entwined with insecurity, weak and corrupt public institutions, persistent impunity, growing drug 
trade activity throughout the region, increasing militarization that undermines community ties, widening 
inequality, and oppressive conditions of poverty (see Mateo 2011, 92, 96). It is also hard to distinguish 
between common crime, social crime, and political crime in a context of lack of rule of law, corruption, 
and targeted violence against those identified as resistance members (Hermannsdorfer 2012, 16). All these 
varied forms of violence coalesce and are expressed in state actions to produce a context that normalizes 
violence and reproduces inequalities that undermine women’s rights.
In 2009, President Manuel Zelaya was overthrown by a right-wing military coup led by Porfirio Lobo, 
following Zelaya’s referendum to propose a constitutional reform. Under the Zelaya government, there 
were modest advances for women’s rights and potential for gains, but these were stunted with the coup. 
The proposed constitutional changes promoted by women’s organizations included equal rights and 
opportunities, sexual and reproductive health and rights, the right to a life free of violence, sex education in 
schools, and political participation with the reinforcement of quotas for equitable and just representation 
in legislative units (Ronderos 2011, 5–6). Ronderos notes, “With the chance to reform the Constitution, 
women’s civil society organizations self-organized in order to agree on a common agenda that would also 
ensure their participation in national policy debates and consultations” (2011, 4).
Before the coup, there was a core group of progressive women within the National Congress who had 
the potential to call on the state to be accountable for rights violations, but most of these representatives 
resigned after the coup (Gell 2012, 1). Many other women’s advocates have been removed from their 
posts in state institutions. Also before the coup, women successfully lobbied the National Congress in 
2008 to create specialized policing units to investigate cases of killings of women. Under the post-coup 
de facto government, these police units were relocated within a year of their creation to attend to general 
street crime, leading to “a much less favourable context for women” (Ronderos 2011, 6). Thus, the coup 
deepened divisions between an increasingly militarized state and much of civil society that had been 
mobilizing to resist it. The reallocation of specialized services represents the state’s acts of omission and 
commission that sustain women’s marginalization through institutional failures to respond to violence 
against women.
Post-coup Honduras also has been characterized by a heightened context of structural violence for 
women, who are disproportionately poor and face even more constrained opportunities in the job 
market and increased levels of poverty, conditions that harm especially indigenous and Afro-descendant 
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populations (UNDP 2010). Honduras’s 2013 Gender Inequality Index ranking of 129 (out of 187 countries 
worldwide) places the loss in potential human development due to gender inequality at 48.2 percent in 
2013. Structural conditions commingle with political conditions (in the form of the state’s actions and 
inactions). Concomitantly, gender and gendered violence in post-coup Honduras permeate institutions 
charged with providing security. While the post-coup era has been characterized by political setbacks and 
obstacles for women’s rights, it has also launched a new wave of violence and state-led repression.
Feminicides and Violence against Women
Feminicides in Honduras have spiked since 2006, rising 300 percent from 202 murders in 2006 to 606 in 
2012. As a basis of comparison, Honduras has a smaller population than New York City (approximately 8.1 
vs 8.5 million); Honduras’s murder rate would undoubtedly be considered a crisis in New York. In 2012, 
feminicide was considered the second-highest cause of death for women of reproductive age in Honduras 
(IACHR 2013, 388). As several data collection activities on gender violence have come to a halt after the 
coup, there are limited data on the nature of crimes and violence against women in Honduras. But existing 
reports, such as those from the Autonomous University’s Violence Observatory, suggest that prevalence 
is high, reporting rates are low, state responses are weak, and impunity is rampant.7 Reported rates of 
domestic violence averaged 14,000 per year between January 2003 and September 2008 (Freedom House 
2010, reporting data from the Honduran Center for Women’s Studies, CEM-H). But it was also reported 
that “few cases of domestic violence are investigated or reach the courts” (Freedom House 2010, para. 
31). In 2011, police reported receiving “216 rape cases and other sexually related crimes against women” 
(Bureau of Democracy 2011, 16). And even though more men than women are killed in the spiral of violence 
in Honduras, there is an important gender angle to these murders, as they follow qualitatively different 
patterns by gender.
As in other countries in the region, murders of women are disproportionately committed by intimate 
partners and have become increasingly brutal and sexualized (IACHR 2013, 288). This is not the case for 
men. While men may be murdered with a bullet to the head, it is common for women (and rare among 
men) to also have postmortem signs of sexualized abuse and torture (IACHR 2013, 288). This phenomenon 
is prevalent in other countries in the region, as has been more widely publicized for Ciudad Juárez, Mexico 
(Fregoso and Bejarano 2010; Gaspar de Alba and Guzmán 2010; Monárrez Fragoso 2002; Morales Trujillo 
2010; Staudt 2008). These distinct gendered patterns and extreme brutality in the killings of women demand 
an analytical lens that connects the various forms of violence that women face.
Rape was “reportedly a serious and pervasive societal problem and continued to be underreported due 
to fear of stigma, retribution, and further violence” (Bureau of Democracy 2011, 16). In the Tegucigalpa 
neighborhoods of Villanueva and Nueva Suyapa, for instance, it was reported that 78 percent of women 
have experienced some form of violence in public spaces, including sexual and physical assault (UN Women 
2013, 1). The stigma associated with sexual violence is pervasive, and often the victims are blamed, a practice 
that contributes to its normalization and impunity.
Like the women interviewed for the UNHCR report (2015), a representative from the Center for Women’s 
Rights in Honduras noted that “victims do not generally report cases of sexual violence; consequently, it is 
very difficult to record the statistics that would demonstrate the severity of the problem. And when women 
do report, they usually withdraw their complaint because they lack financial resources, fear reprisals, feel 
ashamed or are afraid of what their family, friends and the general public will say” (Quoted in Research 
Directorate 2006, para. 7). Compounding fears of reporting, it would seem useless to do so given the lack 
of guarantees for protection, high levels of impunity (e.g., Freedom House 2010; OAS 2011), and the close 
collaborations between state authorities and members of criminal groups. Thus, even though there have 
been advances in the laws, there are key limitations in how they are conceptualized, and implementation is 
limited (or even blocked).
Laws Addressing Domestic Violence in Honduras and Latin America
The laws that have been passed in Honduras to address violence against women are similar to those created 
throughout Latin America and suffer from similar problems in their formulation. The 1994 Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention Belém 
do Pará) established that violence against women constitutes a human rights violation.
 7 Portillo (2016) notes that among other strategies that have obstructed data collection, the post-coup government has radically 
altered the manner in which violent acts are reported. Instead of trained scholars analyzing raw data provided by each police 
precinct, the data are now aggregated by a central police agency, thus preventing a more accurate analysis of crime statistics. 
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Subsequent laws throughout the region were ostensibly created to harmonize local laws with international 
norms. However, proposals for laws focusing on violence against women were often met with resistance at 
the national level. With rare exceptions, governments only passed these laws after redefining the focus 
from the international norm of protecting women from violence to addressing “intrafamily” violence.8 This 
legal move undermined the goal of challenging gender hierarchies (Friedman 2009, 349–351) and did so 
by “implying that family members are ‘equally likely to be perpetrators and victims’” (Craske 2003, 37). In 
addition, most Latin American countries prosecute offenders in civil or family courts rather than criminal 
courts and insist on reconciliation or mediation as a first step in legal proceedings (Macaulay 2006, 104).9 
In reconciliation or mediation proceedings, women are often pressured to tolerate or cope with violent 
situations rather than obtain help to escape them (Jubb and Pasinato Izumino 2002; Jubb et al. 2010). 
Significantly, these measures are not recommended by the international organizations (IACHR 2007, 16, as 
noted in Friedman 2009) or by regional and local advocates. Allowing mediation is one way that these legal 
frameworks and procedures undermine advocates’ intent of protecting women. It should also be noted that 
while the Honduran laws and some practices today resemble broader regional patterns, levels of violence 
and lack of implementation are much more severe in Honduras given the extreme forms of normalized, 
structural, symbolic, and gender violence, in conjunction with the failure of appropriate state actions.
Consequently, Honduran laws regarding domestic violence, rape, and feminicide have serious limitations. 
The 1997 Law against Domestic Violence passed by Congress established a mechanism for abused women to 
obtain a protective order against an abuser (Hermannsdorfer 2012, 20). This law has the status of a “special 
law,” part of neither the civil nor criminal code. However, the way it is written reinforces the normalization of 
violence in women’s lives and the devaluation of their lives and rights, which undermines implementation. 
For a first offense of domestic abuse, the only legal sanctions are community service and twenty-four-hour 
preventive detention if the violator is caught in the act (Bureau of Democracy 2012, 15). The maximum 
sentence for disobeying a restraining order connected with the crime of intrafamilial violence is three years’ 
imprisonment (Bureau of Democracy 2012, 15). Reflecting social expectations of gendered behavior, the law 
criminalizes rape as a public crime but does not grant the same status to spousal rape (see Menjívar 2016), 
which is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In cases of nonspousal rape, a perpetrator can be prosecuted 
even if the victim does not press charges (Bureau of Democracy 2011). On February 21, 2013, Congress 
reformed the Criminal Code and added Article 118 A, establishing femicide as a crime for “men who kill 
women for reasons of gender, with hatred and disdain toward them as women.” However, the law seems to 
be set up to fail, as it is technically challenging to provide legal evidence of hatred and disdain in the minds 
of perpetrators as a motive even when these feelings exist. Furthermore, the law establishes that one of 
the following four circumstances must also be met: “sentimental relationship, history of acts of violence, 
persecution of any kind, or commission with malice” (IACHR 2013, 388), which carries such a heavy burden 
of evidence that it is almost impossible to apply.
Institutional mechanisms and bureaucratic units have been created to implement laws, but these 
institutions are generally underfunded and understaffed, reflecting the symbolic and gender violence in 
the law as it ignores women’s lives and suffering. After the Domestic Violence Law was passed, a Special 
Women’s Public Prosecutors Office was created within the Public Ministry in order to enforce it. However, 
the office had “little power when it came to prosecuting perpetrators of domestic violence” (UNFPA 2009, 
39). In 1999, the National Women’s Institute was established as the “government agency responsible for the 
protection and advancement of Honduran women” (Research Directorate 2010, 3). Additional institutions 
include the Office of the National Human Rights Commissioner and the Interagency Commission on the Law 
against Domestic Violence (Research Directorate 2010, 3). However, since the coup, many of these agencies 
have been weakened or dismantled altogether, exacerbating existing trends. And regarding international 
agreements, Honduras often fails to submit required reports to monitoring bodies, such as the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Follow-up Mechanism 
to the Belém do Pará Convention (MESECVI) (Hermannsdorfer 2012: 20). While it is arguably better to have 
weak and underfunded institutions than none at all, implementation and responsiveness to violence against 
women have been lagging, nonexistent, or even unenforced by state institutions. The views of women 
seeking asylum in the United States show that this can have an insidious effect, as they may conclude that 
 8 As of 2009, only five of these laws in the following four countries in Latin America specifically mentioned women: Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela (Friedman 2009, 249–351). See table 2 for a list.
 9 The practice of reconciliation privileges the family unit over the rights of abused women, renaturalizing “domestic violence by 
implying that a couple can, or should, be reconciled even when one systematically abuses the other” (Macaulay 2006, 110; IACHR 
2007, 90).
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their lives do not matter when laws exist but are ignored (UNHCR 2015). As these asylum seekers explain, 
women do not turn to authorities charged with implementing laws and protecting them, since state officials 
will ignore them. With institutional doors closed, women have nowhere to turn and those who can leave 
the country in search of security. Having laws on the books is necessary but not sufficient for protection. 
Obstacles to implementation, which we attribute to a context of multisided and normalized violence in 
which the police and judiciary operate, is the focus of the upcoming section.
Pre- and Post-Coup Political Responsibility for Feminicide: State’s Acts 
of Omission
Political responsibility for feminicide operated primarily through omission in the pre-coup era, with some 
exceptions where the government took direct action to target women. In this section we illustrate the 
inaction of the police and courts in the pre-coup era, which laid the foundation for a surge in gender-based 
violence against women, including feminicides, and a post-coup escalation of failures in policing. We then 
focus on direct acts of post-coup violence initiated or facilitated by the police and courts that have embroiled 
Honduras in a feminicide crisis today. (See Table 2 for differences between pre-coup and post-coup acts of 
omission and commission.) We separate the time periods for analytical purposes, but in reality both stem 
from the same context that normalizes gender inequalities and shapes the cognitive frames of state actors 
in charge of writing, passing, and implementing laws.
Police Inaction and Multisided Violence: Pre-coup and Post-coup
Inaction by the police was prevalent during the pre-coup era but worsened in the post-coup period. The 
symbolic violence of the state is embedded in these practices, in the police’s treatment of domestic abuse 
as part of “the order of things.” Often, officers attribute culpability for abuse to victims instead of abusers, 
blaming women for failing to avoid maltreatment through altering their behavior and becoming obedient 
and submissive. This police response further entrenches gender inequality, which is first enforced through 
abuse and then reinforced (and normalized) by demonstrating that women have no choice but to submit to 
it. Country expert Claudia Hermannsdorfer (2012) reveals how symbolic and gender violence seep through 
from the social context to the justice system and shape the cognitive frames through which violence against 
women is viewed as a normal aspect of relationships. Reporting on police behavior, she notes: “Women who 
seek help from the police are often told that the issue is a matter for her husband to decide, and that she 
should go home, be intimate with him, and he will forgive her. Other times, police simply tell the women to 
stop disobeying their husbands. . . . Honduran police ignore threats made against women, treating them as 
nothing more than the product of over-excited emotions” (Hermannsdorfer 2012: 11).
Contributing to normalizing violence and the devaluation of women’s lives, police divert resources 
toward the investigation of “more serious” crimes such as drug trafficking. At the structural level, this 
sidelining of women’s interests within the justice system reinforces inequality and sends a message to 
women (and society) that their lives are unimportant (Hermannsdorfer 2012, 11). Symbolic and gender 
violence are normalized through the persistent lack of funding for appropriate investigation. Again, 
Hermannsdorfer observes: “Even if the authorities did want to conduct a sensitive forensic examination 
in cases of femicide, they lack resources, such as rape kits which are commonly used in other countries, 
to perform the exam. . . . Thus, in many cases, it is impossible to make an accurate determination of the 
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extent of sexual violence that is so often associated with the violent deaths of women” (Hermannsdorfer 
2012, 27).
Resource diversion existed before the coup but worsened after it. Resource diversion is an anticipated 
outcome if police lack specialized units that focus on violence against women, because such units help 
to make serving women an institutional aim rather than a discretionary act resting on an officer’s choice 
to ignore or dismiss claims (Walsh 2008). Attempts were made to create a Gender Unit within the police 
that would help institutionalize responsiveness to violence against women before the coup, but this was 
dismantled after the coup. Among other things, the Gender Unit was relegated to a warehouse far away from 
the rest of the police force (Hermannsdorfer 2012). Instead of being a reliable state institution for women 
to turn to for protection, police have reinforced the generalized and entrenched views of gender inequality 
that make women vulnerable to abuse and undermine their rights.
Victim blaming is a form of omission that elucidates the persistent commingling of symbolic and gender 
violence that undergirds impunity. It is a practice with a long history that was present in the pre-coup 
era and persisted after the coup. A poignant example is the police reaction to the assassination of Blanca 
Guevara’s niece shortly after the coup. Guevara is a labor rights and women’s rights activist with the Network 
of Women against Violence in Choluteca, Honduras. Her twenty-three-year old niece was murdered in 2010 
while working on issues of violence against women. Guevara recounts the police’s treatment of the case, 
which exemplifies the symbolic violence embedded in state actors’ approach to treating these cases: “When 
my niece’s father filed the report, the director of the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation (DNIC) 
started blaming the [niece who was the] victim of the assassination. . . . There is an interview with the 
director of the DNIC who said that ‘women walk in places where they should not go’” (Blanca Guevara in 
Memoria Foro Femicidios 2014, 16–17).
Police reactions and dismissals of the seriousness of violence against women put women at risk for further 
abuse and even murder. A recent report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) quoted 
women fleeing from violence in Honduras and noted the futility of going to the police, even as police 
attempted to be helpful:
In the rare cases where police arrested the perpetrators of abuse, the perpetrators were generally 
released within a few days. “I reported my husband to the police once,” explained a woman from 
Honduras. “They detained him, but only for 24 hours, and then he was released and was even more 
angry.” Another Honduran woman, whose mother had been abused by the woman’s father and later 
her stepfather, sometimes made official complaints on her mother’s behalf. But it was useless, she 
says. “They put them in jail for 24 hours and then they are out.” (UNHCR 2015, 27)
In these circumstances, women are afraid to report their cases to the police for fear of retaliation from 
perpetrators. In addition, they now fear police violence against them with the increased militarization of the 
state since the coup.
Court Inaction and Multisided Violence: Pre-coup and Post-coup
The Honduran court system, pre- and post-coup, has reinforced and perpetuated inequality for women 
through a persistent lack of institutionalization and specialization of services for women. For example, 
the Law against Domestic Violence was amended in 2006 to require the creation of specialized domestic 
violence courts. However, as of 2012, Honduras had not set up this court system, exemplifying the symbolic 
and gender violence entrenched in the institutional structure of the state.
Feminicide is the most extreme expression of violence against women but has only recently been 
recognized in the law as an exceptional type of murder through the 2013 Femicide Law, which was passed 
under international pressure. Before this, Honduran law considered a murder “aggravated” if the victim 
was a family member or intimate partner, or if the murder was premeditated. This would result in an 
increased prison term if the law were applied. However, this law was instead applied in favor of men, further 
exacerbating gender inequalities and the perception that women’s lives are expendable. Victim blaming is 
not restricted to the police but persists in the courts through the dismissal of women’s murders as “crimes of 
passion.” These acts of omission exemplify the symbolic violence embedded in cognitive frames throughout 
justice system personnel who justify the murders of women as a consequence of romance: “Judges tend 
to consider murders arising from domestic violence as crimes of passion which should not be met with 
additional penalties, resulting in cases being charged as simple homicide—which carries a lighter sentence—
or outright dismissed. Additionally, judges often blame female victims, assuming that the woman may have 
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instigated the murder, and use this as an additional reason not to consider the murder or to dismiss the case” 
(Hermannsdorfer 2012, 25, emphasis added).
These profound gender inequalities are constitutive of the normalizing cognitive frames that judges and 
prosecutors deploy in carrying out their work; these frames, which express the symbolic violence of the 
social milieu, even become an obstacle to initial murder investigations. For example: “When investigators 
encounter a woman who has obviously been killed by domestic violence, they often reason, ‘well, the 
prosecutor will not fully prosecute this case because this is a crime of passion, so there is no need to conduct 
an in-depth forensic examination’” (Hermannsdorfer 2012, 14).
Across both the police and the courts, women have encountered manifold obstacles to accessing justice, 
which increases their risk of violent victimization. In responding to a survey by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, the Honduran state noted problems throughout its justice system pathway, reporting various 
practices that discourage victims from following through on a complaint before the justice system, including:
(a) the fact that the woman is revictimized in being compelled to recount the crime she has 
experienced on several occasions to different people involved in the investigation;
(b) the victim is threatened on an ongoing basis by the suspect, relatives or legal representatives 
to withdraw the complaint and stop the proceedings, and there is no mechanism in place to 
guarantee the personal safety of the victim or her next of kin;
(c) the criminal proceeding takes a long time until it reaches the oral public trial stage;
(d) having to travel, in some instances, on her own to different places to receive service . . . and
(e) a lack of confidence in the justice system. (IACHR 2011, para. 369)
Acts of omission on the part of the police and in the courts began before the coup, with the state failing 
to adequately implement laws. It takes time to set up institutions and train police and judges, but such 
persistent failures to progress cannot be accounted for by a “learning curve.” In fact, omission appears to 
have worsened since the coup, and disturbing new patterns of commission have emerged, with state actors 
targeting women for violence.
Post-Coup Political Responsibility for Feminicide: Increased Acts of 
Omission and Commission
In the post-coup era, political responsibility for feminicide through omission has intensified, and the 
government began to more systematically target women and more openly and directly commit acts of 
violence against them. In addition, increased government inaction to respond to violence against women 
deteriorated an already acute situation. Together, action and inaction in the context of heightened levels 
of various forms of violence (e.g., structural, political, everyday, gender) have created a “perfect storm” of 
structural conditions that sustains government responsibility for creating an environment that not only 
tolerates routine violence in the lives of women but condones it through its own example. These factors, 
taken together, help explain the upward spiral in violence against women in the post-coup era.
Violence against women intensified in post-coup Honduras in the context of deteriorating rule of law, 
escalating repression, and amplified gender-based, state-led violence that has targeted women (Kelly 2011; 
Morales 2011; Nobel Women’s Initiative 2012). At the same time, generalized violence has increased and 
there is evidence of linkages between the state and armed drug cartels (IACHR 2013, 29). According to the 
Women’s Tribune against Feminicides, state responsiveness to violence against women has weakened, in 
part because “not only did the administrators of justice fail to respond to human rights violations reported 
by women, the police themselves actually became the agents of repression and violators of women’s rights” 
(Morales 2011). Ten percent of the women interviewed for the UNHCR study (2015) reported that the police 
or other authorities were directly implicated in harming them. And in the month following the coup, Oxfam 
Honduras reported that there was “a 60% rise in the number of feminicides, with the bodies of more than 
50 women found in the two largest cities, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The Oxfam report accuses the 
Lobo government, voted in three months after the coup, of inaction and complicity in the growing wave of 
murders” (quoted in Kelly 2011). It was also post-coup when the UN reported that Honduras had the highest 
per capita homicide rate in the world as of 2012 (Nobel Women’s Initiative 2012, 10).
In addition to feminicides, “numerous cases of sexual violence have been documented during forced 
evictions, which are rarely reported for fear of retaliation and due to the rampant impunity in situations 
of violence against women throughout the country” (Jones 2012, 1). This statement is congruent with the 
women’s own voices in the UNHCR (2015) report. Rochelle Jones, of the Association for Women’s Rights 
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in Development (AWID), also notes that the violence is more serious post-coup against women human 
rights defenders, who also face public accusations that they are going against traditional roles assigned 
to women, and they are “threatened with death and sexual violence and are criminalized” (Jones 2012, 1). 
Alicia Reyes, a journalist with Radio Progreso in Honduras, emphasizes how the post-coup military posed 
a direct threat to women who were considering collective action against the new regime: “From the first 
day the police and army sent the women a clear warning: ‘You’ll see what happens to you if you go to the 
streets’” (Reyes 2009, 2).
One form of state omission has been gender-inimical budgeting, which is rooted in the symbolic violence 
in women’s lives, and has been amplified in the post-coup era. The post-coup government has spent a much 
higher proportion of the national budget on the military and has failed to allocate funding to the justice 
sector and women’s institutions. This symbolic violence serves to normalize a militarized “order of things” 
and sends a message to women that there are other more important issues to address. Honduras is not only 
failing to invest in public security for women but has weakened and even reversed the institutionalization of 
security for women.10 In 2012, 11.9 percent of the budget was allocated to Defense and Public Security, while 
only 0.1 percent went to the National Institute of Women and 1.1 percent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(Memoria Foro Femicidios 2014, 57). Greater militarization and armaments signal an absence of a gender 
perspective regarding the problem of public security and swells the number of armed men on the streets. 
Increasing armaments is a direct threat to women, as firearms have been the principal instrument for their 
killings, constituting 334 murders in 2013 (75 percent of the total).11
Another form of post-coup omission has been the government’s systematic concealment of statistical 
information. The Observatory of Violence at the National Autonomous University of Honduras has 
denounced the government for concealing statistics and information about the homicide rate.12 Between 
January and June 2013, the Observatory counted 3,547 cases of homicide, but the Secretary of Security only 
reported 2,629, a difference of 918.13
During the Cold War, Honduras implemented a National Security Doctrine marked by political intolerance, 
which left at least 179 people disappeared from 1980 to 1993.14 Forced disappearances were linked to illegal 
detentions and torture on the part of the police and military. In the post-coup era, these actions appear 
to be more systematic. From 2008 until 2015, there has been a 281 percent increase in reports of women 
disappearing, and 697 reports of disappearances were made to the public prosecutor’s office between 
January and September 2014.15 Political violence in Honduras normalizes its gendered forms and fosters 
impunity, as state agents commit and fail to mitigate the violence.
Since the coup, the military has been increasingly incorporated into the police, and they have used sexual 
violence as a form of repression (Menjívar 2017). Thus, the government does not merely turn the other 
way in the face of gender violence through inaction but becomes an active participant in harming women. 
Women’s rights advocates have criticized the post-coup government’s hostility toward women, which 
includes using rape as a weapon. The popular feminist slogan in Honduras following the 2009 coup was “Ni 
golpes de estado, ni golpes a las mujeres” (No coups, and no abuse of women), highlighting the close links 
between political violence and violence against women (Pine 2013, 5–6). But the post-coup militarization 
behind the escalation of police violence in general also involves collaboration of state actors with members 
of criminal groups in violent acts against women in particular (see UNHCR 2015). This is how symbolic, 
political, and enduring state terror as well as gender and gendered violence commingle in the lives of 
Honduran women today.
In response to the repression against women in the post-coup era, women have created legal statutes 
for the new opposition party, the National Resistance Front, and have been playing a stronger role in the 
post-coup resistance movement (Gell 2012, 1). Indeed, it is the investigations by women in the resistance 
 10 Foro de Mujeres por la Vida, Observatorio Violencia y Seguridad de las Mujeres, Informe contra las Mujeres un problema de 
Seguridad Humana, 2013, 13.
 11 CDM, Foro de Mujeres por la Vida, Red Nacional de Defensoras, CEM-H, JASS CLADEM, “Honduras: Las mujeres y los mecanismos 
internacionales de observancia de los derechos humanos,” 2015, 12.
 12 “Colombia creará 30 observatorios,” El Heraldo, July 7, 2014, http://www.elheraldo.hn/pais/726622-214/colombia-crear%C3%A1-
30-observatorios.
 13 “Seguridad quiere excluir casi mil homicidios,” El Heraldo, July 4, 2014, http://www.elheraldo.hn/alfrente/566383-209/seguridad-
quiere-excluir-casi-mil-homicidios.
 14 Foro de Mujeres por la Vida, Protocolo Norma, “No olvidarlas es el camino para encontrarlas,” Campaña contra desaparición forzada 
de mujeres en Honduras,” 2015, 20.
 15 Foro de Mujeres por la Vida, Protocolo Norma, “No olvidarlas es el camino para encontrarlas,” Campaña contra desaparición forzada 
de mujeres en Honduras,” 2015, 20.
Menjívar and Walsh 235 
movement that have brought to light grotesque uses of force against women by an increasingly militarized 
state: “Their investigations documented hundreds of women’s testimonies relating to numerous forms of 
post-coup related sexual assaults that included groping and beatings of breasts and vaginas, threats of sexual 
violence, intimidation tactics with explicit sexist insults, as well as gang rapes by soldiers and police during 
post-protest detentions, curfew sweeps and night raids” (Gervais and Estevez 2011, 10).
Militarized acts of violence against the resistance have involved sexualized and chauvinistic forms of 
violence against women. During demonstrations, security forces have verbally abused women participants, 
insulting them as “whores” and saying, “What they want is for us to rape them,” and “Go take care of your 
children.”16 Some security agents have been reported to have raped women with their police batons and 
raped women after they were detained for participating in protests.17
Meanwhile, the murders of most women have remained unpunished. Some are reported to have been 
committed by government actors. For example, Margarita Murillo was a member of the National Popular 
Resistance Front and one of the founders of the National Center of Farmworkers (CNTC). The National 
Forum of Women for Life reports that she was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered by a death squad.18 She 
was shot in the back on August 27, 2014, and her case remains in impunity.19 And murder investigations 
seldom produce results. In March 2016, the indigenous activist leader Berta Cáceres was murdered in what 
the police alleged was a robbery. In October 2016 her case files were stolen from a Supreme Court justice, 
almost ensuring that the investigation will be dropped. And in July 2016, the body of Lesbia Janeth Urquía, 
a member of Cáceres’s organization, was found brutally assaulted in a garbage dump west of Tegucigalpa. 
According to police, the motive for the murder was a robbery—of her bicycle. Such declarations (disseminated 
in the press) trivialize the lives, work, and deaths of these activist women, sending a powerful message to all 
women that normalizes their socially expected roles and diminishes their contributions to public life and 
to social justice.
The coup in Honduras exacerbated a context of multisided violence in part by increasing political violence 
and state terror in ways that amplified gendered and gender violence. Through acts of commission and 
omission, the state has been responsible for intensifying a multilayered context of violence resulting in 
increased violence and abuses, and where killings remain suspended in impunity. The coup took what was 
already a dangerous place for women and escalated the danger further, creating a context where women 
credibly fear violence not only in their homes and in the streets but also from the very institutions and state 
agents charged with protecting them.
Conclusion
Multisided violence encompasses structural, symbolic, political, gender, and gendered forms. We have 
argued that a context of multisided violence creates conditions for states to fail in their responses to 
violence against women through normalizing and institutionalizing profound gender inequalities. The 
symbolic violence of the state serves as a catalyst for acts of omission and commission by shaping the views 
and actions of state actors in charge of implementing laws.
While acts of omission were prevalent in the pre-coup era, the commission of violent acts has become 
widespread in the more extreme context of multisided violence after the coup. State actions in post-coup 
Honduras help explain the upward spiral of violence that citizens in general are suffering, which are 
manifested in gendered ways. We have called attention to inequalities that are connected to but move 
beyond income and poverty, as these are manifested in the unequal citizenship rights of women. In doing 
so, we underscore the central place of the state in perpetuating gender violence.
Along with other countries in northern Central America, Honduras is falling behind its regional neighbors 
in Latin America in terms of human development, with high levels of extreme poverty, income inequality, 
and poor access to services (Ronderos 2011; UNDP 2010), as well as increased “common crime,” corruption, 
and insecurity. Structural violence places women, especially poor and vulnerable women, at higher risk of 
institutional mistreatment (in the form of symbolic violence) and of everyday and routinized abuse (in the 
form of gender violence and gendered violence). As has been the case in post-coup Honduras, this situation 
deteriorates further with state repression and increased militarization, which undermine the rule of law.
 16 CIDH, Honduras: Derechos Humanos y Golpe de Estado, 2009, Párrafo 525.
 17 CIDH, Honduras: Derechos Humanos y Golpe de Estado, 2009, Párrafo 521.
 18 Foro de Mujeres por la Vida, Historias de defensoras de Derechos Humanos, 2014, 7–10.
 19 “Impunidad a un año de la muerte de Margarit Murillo: DDHH,” La Prensa, August 27, 2015, http://www.laprensa.hn/
sucesos/873443-410/impunidad-a-un-a%C3%B1o-de-la-muerte-de-margarita-murillo-ddhh.
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While other countries, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, exhibit extreme levels of multisided violence, they 
have made relatively more progress than Honduras toward creating specialized services (e.g., Ciudad Mujer in 
El Salvador, and specialized femicide courts in Guatemala). In Honduras, the coup stunted the development 
of institutions that aim to address violence against women. Furthermore, post-coup militarization has 
increased impunity through decreased transparency (as evident in the failure to report statistics on violence 
against women) and accountability (by failing to hold military personnel and even civilians accountable 
for violence against women). By contrast, Nicaragua and Costa Rica have relatively lower overall levels of 
multisided violence and lower levels of feminicide and impunity. Thus, comparatively, the more extreme 
context of multisided violence in Honduras has resulted in high levels of feminicide and impunity.
Honduran women, as well as those in similar contexts in the region, live in a social milieu where physical 
and psychological mistreatment become part of the way things are; where women’s “private terrors” 
(Menjívar 2011) are part of life in the home, in the street, and in the workplace. Institutions reinforce and 
reflect this violent context through neglect and a lack of implementation of the laws. We argue that these 
are all deeply connected, because those who abuse women, as well as those who write or implement laws, 
draw on the cognitive frames and lenses through which they view the place of women in society and justify 
unequal treatment of women from the same social order of things.
Our focus on pre- and post-coup feminicide levels reveals intersections among political, social, and economic 
exclusion as well as gendered inequality, exacerbating conditions of violence and impunity and culminating in 
a feminicide crisis in Honduras today. It is the deep-seated symbolic violence in this system that sends a message 
to women who seek justice in unequal institutions that their lives are not valued and that their complaints 
are not taken seriously, a message that serves to normalize abuse and gender inequalities but also to silence 
women. A 2012 study found that less than one-third (29.3 percent) of women told family or friends that they 
had experienced intimate partner violence in the past year, a low number even compared to El Salvador, where 
almost two-thirds (66.5 percent) indicated they would share this with family or friends (Bott et al. 2012, 58).
We have demonstrated that passing laws to protect women will not accomplish their goals when this is 
done without the broader societal changes that could improve conditions for everyone. The content of the 
laws themselves, the failure to implement them, and the messages that an institutionalized inattention send 
to women are rooted in a deeply unequal society that devalues women’s lives and those of vulnerable people 
in general. This is made worse when state actions, far from improving conditions, exacerbate existing trends 
of gender inequalities that disadvantage women seeking justice. We have moved beyond assessing the impact 
of economic indicators on women’s inequality to examining inequalities in the form of citizenship rights 
as women seek justice for the violence they routinely endure. Examining structural inequality is crucial for 
understanding broader patterns of inequality in Latin America, as it not only impacts poverty levels and 
access to material resources but also shapes unequal access to safety and justice.
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